T U T O R I A L
|
Mobile
IP uses two IP addresses:
a fixed home address and a care-of address that changes at each new point of attachment. |
Home agents use agent advertisements to make themselves known, even if they do not offer any care-of addresses. However, it is not possible to associate preferences to the various care-of addresses in the router advertisement, as is the case with default routers. The IETF working group was concerned that dynamic preference values might destabilize the operation of Mobile IP. Because no one could defend static preference assignments except for backup mobility agents, which do not help distribute the routing load, the group eventually decided not to use the preference assignments with the care-of address list.
Thus, an agent advertisement performs the following functions:
Mobile nodes use router solicitations as defined in RFC 1256 to detect any change in the set of mobility agents available at the current point of attachment. (In Mobile IP this is then termed agent solicitation.) If advertisements are no longer detectable from a foreign agent that previously had offered a care-of address to the mobile node, the mobile node should presume that foreign agent is no longer within range of the mobile node's network interface. In this situation, the mobile node should begin to hunt for a new care-of address, or possibly use a care-of address known from advertisements it is still receiving. The mobile node may choose to wait for another advertisement if it has not received any recently advertised care-of addresses, or it may send an agent solicitation.
Registering the Care-of
Address
Once a mobile node has a care-of address, its home
agent must find out about it. Figure 1 shows the registration process defined by
Mobile IP for this purpose. The process begins when the mobile node,
possibly with the assistance of a foreign agent, sends a registration
request with the care-of address information. When the home agent receives
this request, it (typically) adds the necessary information to its routing
table, approves the request, and sends a registration reply back to the
mobile node. Although the home agent is not required by the Mobile IP
protocol to handle registration requests by updating entries in its
routing table, doing so offers a natural implementation strategy, and all
implementations I know of take this approach.
Authentication. Registration requests contain parameters and flags that characterize the tunnel through which the home agent will deliver packets to the care-of address. Tunnels can be constructed in various ways, described briefly in the next section.10 , 11 When a home agent accepts the request, it begins to associate the home address of the mobile node with the care-of address, and maintains this association until the registration lifetime expires. The triplet that contains the home address, care-of address, and registration lifetime is called a binding for the mobile node. A registration request can be considered a binding update sent by the mobile node.
A binding update is an example of a remote redirect, because it is sent remotely to the home agent to affect the home agent's routing table. This view of registration makes the need for authentication very clear.12 The home agent must be certain registration was originated by the mobile node and not by some other malicious node pretending to be the mobile node. A malicious node could cause the home agent to alter its routing table with erroneous care-of address information, and the mobile node would be unreachable to all incoming communications from the Internet.
The need to authenticate registration information has played a major role in determining the acceptable design parameters for Mobile IP. Each mobile node and home agent must share a security association and be able to use Message Digest 5 (RFC 1321) with 128-bit keys to create unforgeable digital signatures for registration requests.13 The signature is computed by performing MD5's one-way hash algorithm over all the data within the registration message header and the extensions that precede the signature.
To secure the registration request, each request must contain unique data so that two different registrations will in practical terms never have the same MD5 hash. Otherwise, the protocol would be susceptible to replay attacks, in which a malicious node could record valid registrations for later replay, effectively disrupting the ability of the home agent to tunnel to the current care-of address of the mobile node at that later time. To ensure this does not happen, Mobile IP includes within the registration message a special identification field that changes with every new registration. The exact semantics of the identification field depend on several details, which are described at greater length in the protocol specification.1 Briefly, there are two main ways to make the identification field unique.
One is to use a timestamp; then each new registration will have a later timestamp and thus differ from previous registrations. The other is to cause the identification to be a pseudorandom number; with enough bits of randomness, it is highly unlikely that two independently chosen values for the identification field will be the same. When randomness is used, Mobile IP defines a method that protects both the registration request and reply from replay, and calls for 32 bits of randomness in the identification field. If the mobile node and the home agent get too far out of synchronization for the use of timestamps, or if they lose track of the expected random numbers, the home agent will reject the registration request and include information to allow resynchronization within the reply. Using random numbers instead of timestamps avoids problems stemming from attacks on the NTP protocol that might cause the mobile node to lose time synchronization with the home agent or to issue authenticated registration requests for some future time that could be used by a malicious node to subvert a future registration.
The identification field is also used by the foreign agent to match pending registration requests to registration replies when they arrive at the home agent and to subsequently be able to relay the reply to the mobile node. The foreign agent also stores other information for pending registrations, including the mobile node's home address, the mobile node's Media Access Layer (MAC) address, the source port number for the registration request from the mobile node, the registration lifetime proposed by the mobile node, and the home agent's address. The foreign agent can limit registration lifetimes to a configurable value that it puts into its agent advertisements. The home agent can reduce the registration lifetime, which it includes as part of the registration reply, but it can never increase it.
As Figure 1 shows, in Mobile IP foreign agents are mostly passive, relaying registration requests and replies back and forth between the home agent and the mobile node, doing mostly what they are told. The foreign agent also decapsulates traffic from the home agent and forwards it to the mobile node. They Note that foreign agents do not have to authenticate themselves to the mobile node or home agent. A bogus foreign agent could impersonate a real foreign agent simply by following protocol and offering agent advertisements to the mobile node. The bogus agent could, for instance, then refuse to forward decapsulated packets to the mobile node when they were received. However, the result is no worse than if any node were tricked into using the wrong default router, which is possible using unauthenticated router advertisements as specified in RFC 1256.9
Automatic home agent discovery. When the mobile node cannot contact its home agent, Mobile IP has a mechanism that lets the mobile node try to register with another unknown home agent on its home network. This method of automatic home agent discovery works by using a broadcast IP address instead of the home agent's IP address as the target for the registration request. When the broadcast packet gets to the home network, other home agents on the network will send a rejection to the mobile node; however, their rejection notice will contain their address for the mobile node to use in a freshly attempted registration message. Note that the broadcast is not an Internet-wide broadcast, but a directed broadcast that reaches only IP nodes on the home network.
Tunneling to the Care-of
Address
Figure 2 shows the tunneling operations in Mobile IP. The
default encapsulation mechanism that must be supported by all mobility
agents using Mobile IP is IP-within-IP.10
Using IP-within-IP, the home agent, the tunnel source,
inserts a new IP header, or tunnel header, in front of the IP
header of any datagram addressed to the mobile node's home address. The
new tunnel header uses the mobile node's care-of address as the
destination IP address, or tunnel destination. The tunnel source IP
address is the home agent, and the tunnel header uses 4 as the higher
level protocol number, indicating that the next protocol header is again
an IP header. In IP-within-IP the entire original IP header is preserved
as the first part of the payload of the tunnel header. Therefore, to
recover the original packet, the foreign agent merely has to eliminate the
tunnel header and deliver the rest to the mobile node.
Figure 2 shows that sometimes the tunnel header uses protocol number 55 as the inner header. This happens when the home agent uses minimal encapsulation11 instead of IP-within-IP. Processing for the minimal encapsulation header is slightly more complicated than that for IP-within-IP, because some of the information from the tunnel header is combined with the information in the inner minimal encapsulation header to reconstitute the original IP header. On the other hand, header overhead is reduced.
Interoperability testing sessions
have indicated that the Mobile IP specification is sound,
implementable, and of diverse interest throughout the Internet
community.
|
Mobility Support in IPv6,18 as proposed by the Mobile IP working group, follows the design for Mobile IPv4. It retains the ideas of a home network, home agent, and the use of encapsulation to deliver packets from the home network to the mobile node's current point of attachment. While discovery of a care-of address is still required, a mobile node can configure its a care-of address by using Stateless Address Autoconfiguration and Neighbor Discovery. Thus, foreign agents are not required to support mobility in IPv6. IPv6-within-IPv6 tunneling is also already specified.19
Route Optimization
IPv6
mobility borrows heavily from the route optimization ideas specified for
IPv4,20
particularly the idea of delivering binding updates directly to
correspondent nodes. When it knows the mobile node's current care-of
address, a correspondent node can deliver packets directly to the mobile
node's home address without any assistance from the home agent. Route
optimization is likely to dramatically improve performance for IPv6 mobile
nodes. It is realistic to require this extra functionality of all IPv6
nodes for two reasons. First, on a practical level, IPv6 standards
documents are still at an early stage of standardization, so it is
possible to place additional requirements on IPv6 nodes. Second,
processing binding updates can be implemented as a fairly simple
modification to IPv6's use of the destination cache.15
Security
One of the
biggest differences between IPv6 and IPv4 is that all IPv6 nodes are
expected to implement strong authentication and encryption features21 , 22
to improve Internet security. This affords a major simplification for IPv6
mobility support, since all authentication procedures can be assumed to
exist when needed and do not have to be specified in the Mobile IPv6
protocol. Even with the security features in IPv6, however, the current
working group draft for IPv6 mobility support specifies the use of
authentication procedures as infrequently as possible. The reasons for
this are twofold. First, good authentication comes at the cost of
performance and so should be required only occasionally. Second, questions
about the availability of Internet-wide key management are far from
resolved at this time.
Source Routing
In
contrast to the way in which route optimization is specified in
IPv4, in IPv6 correspondent nodes do not tunnel packets to mobile nodes.
Instead, they use IPv6 routing headers, which implement a variation of
IPv4's source routing option. A number of early proposals for
supporting mobility in IPv4 specified a similar use of source routing
options,23 , 24
but two main problems precluded their use:
However, the objections to the use of source routes do not apply to IPv6, because IPv6's more careful specification eliminates the need for source-route reversal and lets routers ignore options that do not need their attention. Consequently, correspondent nodes can use routing headers without penalty. This allows the mobile node to easily determine when a correspondent node does not have the right care-of address. Packets delivered by encapsulation instead of by source routes in a routing header must have been sent by correspondent nodes that need to receive binding updates from the mobile node. It is a further point of contrast to route optimization in IPv4 that, in IPv6 mobility support, the mobile node delivers binding updates to correspondent nodes instead of to the home agent. In IPv6, key management between the mobile node and correspondent node is more likely to be available.
Other features supported by IPv6 mobility include
Problems Facing Mobile IP
The most pressing outstanding problem facing Mobile IP is that of
security, but other technical as well as practical obstacles to deployment
exist.26
Work is also continuing to refine and extend the protocol within
the academic and commercial communities and within the IETF. This section
surveys the state of implementation of Mobile IP and speculates on a
possible timetable for deployment.
Routing inefficiencies. The base Mobile IP specification has the effect of introducing a tunnel into the routing path followed by packets sent by the correspondent node to the mobile node. Packets from the mobile node, on the other hand, can go directly to the correspondent node with no tunneling required. This asymmetry is captured by the term triangle routing, where a single leg of the triangle goes from the mobile node to the correspondent node, and the home agent forms the third vertex controlling the path taken by data from the correspondent node to the mobile node. Triangle routing is alleviated by use of techniques in the route optimization draft,20 but doing so requires changes in the correspondent nodes that will take a long time to deploy for IPv4. It is hoped that triangle routing will not be a factor for IPv6 mobility.
Security issues. A great deal of attention is being focused on making Mobile IP coexist with the security features coming into use within the Internet. Firewalls,27 in particular, cause difficulty for Mobile IP because they block all classes of incoming packets that do not meet specified criteria. Enterprise firewalls are typically configured to block packets from entering via the Internet that appear to emanate from internal computers. Although this permits management of internal Internet nodes without great attention to security, it presents difficulties for mobile nodes wishing to communicate with other nodes within their home enterprise networks. Such communications, originating from the mobile node, carry the mobile node's home address, and would thus be blocked by the firewall.
As
proposed by the Mobile IP working group,
mobility support for IPv6 follows the design for Mobile IPv4, using encapsulation to deliver packets from the home network to the mobile point of attachment. |
Mobile IP can be viewed as a protocol for establishing secure tunnels. Gupta and Glass have proposed a firewall traversal solution.28 Efforts along these lines are also being made at BBN as part of the MOIPS (Managed Objects for IP Mobility Support)29 project to extend Mobile IP operation across firewalls, even when multiple security domains are involved.
Ingress filtering. Complications are also presented by ingress filtering25 operations. Many border routers discard packets coming from within the enterprise if the packets do not contain a source IP address configured for one of the enterprise's internal networks. Because mobile nodes would otherwise use their home address as the source IP address of the packets they transmit, this presents difficulty. Solutions to this problem in Mobile IPv4 typically involve tunneling outgoing packets from the care-of address, but then the difficulty is how to find a suitable target for the tunneled packet from the mobile node. The only universally agreed on possibility is the home agent, but that target introduces yet another serious routing anomaly for communications between the mobile node and the rest of the Internet. Montenegro has proposed the use of reverse tunnels to the home agent to counter the restriction imposed by ingress filtering.30 Mobile IPv6 also offers a solution in the home address destination option.18
User perceptions of reliability. The design of Mobile IP is founded on the premise that connections based on TCP should survive cell changes. However, opinion is not unanimous on the need for this feature. Many people believe that computer communications to laptop computers are sufficiently bursty that there is no need to increase the reliability of the connections supporting the communications. The analogy is made to fetching Web pages by selecting the appropriate URLs. If a transfer fails, people are used to trying again. This is tantamount to making the user responsible for the retransmission protocol and depends for its acceptability on a widespread perception that computers and the Internet cannot be trusted to do things right the first time. Naturally, such assumptions are strongly distasteful to many Internet protocol engineers, myself included. Nevertheless, the fact that products exhibiting this model are currently economically viable cannot be denied. Hopefully in the near future better engineering will counter this perception and increase the demand for Internet reliability.
Issues in IP addressing. Mobile IP creates the perception that the mobile node is always attached to its home network. This forms the basis for the reachability of the mobile node at an IP address that can be conventionally associated with its fully qualified domain name (FQDN).31 If the FQDN is associated with one or more other IP addresses, perhaps dynamically, then those alternative IP addresses may deserve equal standing with the mobile node's home address. Moreover, it is possible that such an alternative IP address would offer a shorter routing path if, for instance, the address were apparently located on a physical link nearer to the mobile node's care-of address, or if the alternative address were the care-of address itself. Finally, many communications are short-lived and depend on neither the actual identity of the mobile node nor its FQDN, and thus do not take advantage of the simplicity afforded by use of the mobile node's home address. These issues surrounding the mobile node's selection of an appropriate long-term (or not-so-long-term) address for use in establishing connections are complex and are far from being resolved.
Slow growth in the wireless LAN market. Mobile IP has been engineered as a solution for wireless LAN location management and communications, but the wireless LAN market has been slow to develop. It is difficult to make general statements about the reasons for this slow development, but with the recent ratification of the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol,32 wireless LANs may become more popular. Moreover, the bandwidth for wireless devices has been constantly improving, so that radio and infrared devices on the market today offer multimegabyte-per-second data rates. Faster wireless access over standardized MAC layers could be a major catalyst for growth of this market.
Competition from other protocols. Mobile IP may well face competition from alternative tunneling protocols such as PPTP33 and L2TP.34 These other protocols, based on PPP, offer at least portability to mobile computers. Although I believe portable operation will ultimately not be a long-term solution, it may look quite attractive in the short term in the absence of full Mobile IP deployment. If these alternative methods are made widely available, it is unclear if the use of Mobile IP will be displaced or instead made more immediately desirable as people experience the convenience of mobile computing. In the future, it is also possible that Mobile IP could specify use of such alternative tunneling protocols to capitalize on their deployment on platforms that do not support IP-within-IP encapsulation.
Current Development Efforts
Mobile IP has been studied in a number of wireless communication
research projects. At the University of California at Berkeley,35
Mobile IP is being used to construct vertical handoffs between
dissimilar media (for example, infrared, radio LANs, wide-area cellular,
and satellite), depending upon error rates and bandwidth availability.
Other factors such as cost and predictive service might also be taken into
account. CMU's Monarch project36
has been the focus of investigation into campus wireless
networks, Mobile IP, Mobile IPv6, and ad-hoc networking.37
Other academic efforts have been proceeding at the University of
Portland, University of Alabama, University of Texas, UCLA, Macquarie
University, SUNY Binghampton, University of Singapore, Swedish Royal
Institute of Technology, and many others. Two books about Mobile IP have
recently been published.2 , 38
Current IETF drafts that employ Mobile IP include the Tunnel Establishment Protocol39 and Mobile IP Local Registration with Hierarchical Foreign Agents.40 The latter uses the ability to advertise multiple foreign agents to arrange hierarchies of mobility agents. This may help cut the number of registrations that must transit the global Internet between the home and foreign networks. DHCP for Mobile Networking with TCP/IP41 investigates the suitability of using the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol42 , 43 to provide care-of addresses to mobile nodes.41 Mobile IPv4 Configuration Option for PPP IPCP44 is a new extension to PPP45 that will enable dial-up users to more efficiently employ their dynamic IP addresses as care-of addresses.
As this brief introduction to mobile networking has shown, Mobile IP has great potential. Security needs are getting active attention and will benefit from the deployment efforts underway. Within the IETF, Mobile IP is likely to move from a proposed standard1 to a draft standard46 in the near future.
The IETF standardization process requires the working group to rigorously demonstrate interoperability among various independent implementations before the protocol can advance. FTP Software has hosted two interoperability testing sessions, and many vendors have taken advantage of the opportunity. Test results have given added confidence that the Mobile IP specification is sound, implementable, and of diverse interest throughout the Internet community. Only a few minor revisions have been needed to ensure the specification can be interpreted in only one way by the network protocol engineers and programmers who must implement it.
It is possible that the deployment pace of Mobile IP will track that of IPv6, or that the requirements for supporting mobility in IPv6 nodes will give additional impetus to the deployment of both IPv6 and mobile networking. The increased user convenience and the reduced need for application awareness of mobility can be a major driving force for adoption. Since both IPv6 and Mobile IP have little direct effect on the operating systems of mobile computers outside of the network layer of the protocol stack, application designers should find this to be an acceptable programming environment. Of course, everything depends heavily on the willingness of platform and router vendors to implement Mobile IP and/or IPv6, but indications are strong that most major vendors already have implementations either finished or underway. *
REFERENCES
1. "IP Mobility Support," C. Perkins, ed., IETF RFC 2002, Oct. 1996.
2. C. Perkins, Mobile IP: Design Principles and Practice, Addison-Wesley Longman, Reading, Mass., 1998.
3. C. Perkins, "Mobile IP," IEEE Comm., Vol. 35, No. 5, 1997, pp. 8499.
4. S. Deering and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification," IETF RFC 1883, Dec. 1995.
5. R. Hinden and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture," IETF RFC 1884, Dec. 1995.
6. "Internet Protocol," J.B. Postel, ed., IETF RFC 791, Sept. 1981.
7. CDPD Consortium, "Cellular Digital Packet Data Specification," PO Box 809320, Chicago, Ill., July 1993, http://www.cdpd.org/public/specification/index.html.
8. P. Bhagwat, C. Perkins, and S.K. Tripathi, "Network Layer Mobility: An Architecture and Survey," IEEE Personal Comm., Vol. 3, No. 3, June 1996, pp. 5464.
9. "ICMP Router Discovery Messages," S.E. Deering, ed., IETF RFC 1256, Sept. 1991.
10. C. Perkins, "IP Encapsulation Within IP," IETF RFC 2003, May 1996.
11. C. Perkins, "Minimal Encapsulation Within I," IETF RFC 2004, May 1996.
12. V.L. Voydock and S.T. Kent, "Security Mechanisms in High-Level Networks," ACM Computer Surveys, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1983, pp. 135171.
13. R.L. Rivest, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm," IETF RFC 1321, Apr. 1992.
14. S. Thomson and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration," IETF RFC 1971, Aug. 1996.
15. T. Narten, E. Nordmark, and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)," IETF RFC 1970, Aug. 1996.
16. I. Castineyra, J. Chiappa, and M. Steenstrup, "The Nimrod Routing Architecture," IETF RFC 1992, Aug. 1996.
17. S. Bradner and A. Mankin, "The Recommendation for the IP Next Generation Protocol," IETF RFC 1752, Jan. 1995.
18. D. Johnson and C. Perkins, "Mobility Support in IPv6," ACM Mobicom 96, ACM, Nov. 1996, pp. 2737.
19. A. Conta and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6," ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipngwg-ipv6-tunnel-07.txt, July 1996 (work in progress).
20. C.E. Perkins and D.B. Johnson, "Route Optimization in Mobile-I," ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-mobileip-optim-07.txt, Nov. 1997 (work in progress).
21. S. Kent and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header," ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipsec-auth-header-03.txt, Nov. 1997 (work in progress).
22. S. Kent and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)," ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-v2-02.txt, Nov. 1997 (work in progress).
23. C. Perkins and P. Bhagwat, "A Mobile Networking System Based on Internet Protocol(IP)," Proc. USENIX Symp. Mobile and Location-Independent Computing, Aug. 1993, USENIX Assoc., pp. 6982.
24. D.B. Johnson, Scalable and Robust Internetwork Routing for Mobile Hosts, Proc. 14th Intl. Conf. Distributed Computing Systems, June 1994, pp. 211.
25. P. Ferguson and D. Senie, "Ingress Filtering in the Internet," ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ferguson-ingress-filtering-03.txt, Oct. 1997 (work in progress).
26. S. Cheshire and M. Baker, "Internet Mobility 4x4," Proc. ACM SIGCOMM Conf. Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Comm., Vol. 26, No. 4, ACM SIGCOMM Computer Comm. Rev., ACM Press, New York, 1996, pp. 318329.
27. W.R. Cheswick and S. Bellovin, Firewalls and Internet Security, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1994.
28. V. Gupta and S. Glass, "Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP: Guidelines for Firewalls and Mobile IP Entities," ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-mobileip-firewall-trav-00.txt, Mar. 1997 (work in progress).
29. J. Zao et al., "A Public-Key Based Secure Mobile IP," Proc. ACM Mobicom 97, ACM, New York, Oct. 1997, pp. 173184.
30. G. Montenegro, "Reverse Tunneling for Mobile I," ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-mobileip-tunnel-reverse-04.txt, Aug. 1997 (work in progress).
31. P. Mockapetris, "Domain Names--Concepts and Facilities," STD 13, IETF, Nov. 1987.
32. "Wireless LAN, MAC, and PHY Specifications," IEEE Document P802.11/D6.1.97/5, June 1997, AlphaGraphics #35, 10201 N. 35th Ave., Phoenix, AZ 85051.
33. G. Pall et al., "Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol--PPT," ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pppext-pptp-02.txt, July 1997 (work in progress).
34. W. Palter et al., "Layer Two Tunneling Protocol 'L2TP,'" ftp://ftp.ietf.org/
internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pppext-l2tp-08.txt, Nov. 1997 (work in progress).35. R.H. Katz, "Adaptation and Mobility in Wireless Information Systems," IEEE Personal Comm., Vol. 1, No. 1, 1994, pp. 617.
36. D.B. Johnson and D.A. Maltz, "Protocols for Adaptive Wireless and Mobile Networking," IEEE Personal Comm., Vol. 3, No. 1, Feb. 1996, pp. 3442.
37. D.B. Johnson and D.A. Maltz, "Dynamic Source Routing in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks," in Mobile Computing, T. Imielinski and H. Korth, eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, pp. 153181.
38. J. Solomon, Mobile IP: The Internet Unplugged, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1998.
39. P. Calhoun and C. Perkins, "Tunnel Establishment Protocol (TEP)," ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-mobileip-calhoun-tep-00.txt, Aug. 1997 (work in progress).
40. C. Perkins, "Mobile-IP Local Registration with Hierarchical Foreign Agents," ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-perkins-mobileip-hierfa-00.txt, Feb. 1996 (work in progress).
41. C. Perkins and J. Tangirala, "DHCP for Mobile Networking with TCP/IP," Proc. IEEE Int'l Symp. Systems and Comm., June 1995, pp. 255261.
42. R. Droms, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol," IETF RFC 2131, Mar. 1997.
43. S. Alexander and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions," IETF RFC 2132, Mar. 1997.
44. J. Solomon and S. Glass, "Mobile-IPv4 Configuration Option for PPP IPC," ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pppext-ipcp-mip-02.txt, July 1997 (work in progress).
45. "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)," W.A. Simpson, ed., IETF RFC 1661, July 1994.
46. "IP Mobility Support Version 2," C. Perkins, ed., draft-ietf-mobileip-v2-00.txt, Nov. 1997 (work in progress).
Charles E. Perkins is a senior staff engineer at Sun Microsystems, where he is developing Service Location Protocol and investigating dynamic configuration protocols for mobile networking. He is document editor for the Mobile IP working group of the IETF, where he also serves on the Internet Architecture Board. He has worked on various committees for the National Research Council and is currently chair of the Nomadicity Working Team of the Cross-Industry Working Team (XIWT). Perkins holds a BA in mathematics and an MEE from Rice University,, and an MA in mathematics from Columbia University. He is on the editorial boards of ACM/IEEE Transactions on Networking, Wireless Networks, and Mobile Communications and Computing Review. He is a member of IEEE, ISOC, ACM, and IETF.
Contact Perkins at Technology Development Group, Mail Stop MPK 15-214, Sun Microsystems, Mountain View, CA 94303; email mailto:charles.perkins@sun.com; http://www.srvloc.org/charliep/charliep.html.
The Mobile IP Working Group of the Internet Engineering task Force (IETF) had its origin in BOF (Birds of a Feather) sessions held at the Atlanta (July 1991), Santa Fe (November 1991), and San Diego (March 1992) IETF meetings. In June 1992 Steve Deering, chair of the working group, submitted a proposed charter for a formal Working Group to the IETF, and, following a revision of the charter, the Working Group was officially formed in June 30, 1992. An IPv4 Mobile Host Protocol was submitted to the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) as a proposed standard in 1996. An IPv6 protocol will be submitted to the IESG later this year.
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