
Three Cognitive Markers of Unconscious Semantic Activation
Anthony G. Greenwald,
*
Sean C. Draine,
Richard L. Abrams
A "response window" technique is described and used to
reliably demonstrate unconscious activation of meaning by subliminal
(visually masked) words. Visually masked prime words were shown to
influence judged meaning of following target words. This priming-effect
marker was used to identify two additional markers of unconscious
semantic activation: (i) the activation is very short-lived (the target
word must occur within about 100 milliseconds of the subliminal prime);
and (ii) unlike supraliminal prime-target pairs, a subliminal pair
leaves no memory trace that can be observed in response to the next
prime-target pair. Thus, unconscious semantic activation is shown to be
a readily reproducible phenomenon but also very limited in the duration
of its effect.
Department of Psychology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA.
*
To whom correspondence should be addressed at Department of
Psychology, University of Washington, Box 351525, Seattle, WA
98195-1525, USA. E-mail: agg@u.washington.edu
Demonstrations of judgments or actions
being influenced by unperceived stimuli (1) have both
interesting and uninteresting possibilities for interpretation. The
uninteresting possibility is that perceptual measurements have been
insensitive the critical stimuli may have been perceived, but the
research apparatus or procedure failed to register that perception. The
more interesting but also controversial possibility is that
stimulus-triggered cognition has indeed occurred without conscious
perception of the initiating stimulus. Tests of the hypothesis of
unaware perception date from the late 19th century (2). When
claims of analysis of semantic information from unperceived stimuli
were strongly pressed in the second half of the 20th century
(3), methodological critiques (4) of the adequacy
of evidence for such claims resulted in widespread skepticism about
those claims.
In this controversial domain, experimental work of the past two decades
has focused on claimed findings of subliminal semantic activation
(5) the claim that word meanings are analyzed when words
are presented so as to evade conscious perception. Subliminal semantic
activation is most often investigated with priming procedures. Subjects
perform a two-choice categorization task that is supplemented by the
presentation of a subliminal prime word shortly before each
to-be-judged target stimulus word. The two categorization tasks that
have been used most often for tests of subliminal priming have the
subject decide whether or not a target letter string forms a word
(6) or whether a target word is pleasant or unpleasant in
meaning (7). Priming is said to occur when the meaning of
the prime affects the speed or accuracy of response to the target.
Priming is given the controversial label "subliminal" if it occurs
when the prime is visually masked to reduce or eliminate conscious
perception (8).
Despite numerous empirical demonstrations, subliminal priming has
remained a controversial phenomenon because (i) reported findings have
been statistically weak, (ii) it has been difficult to provide
convincing evidence that visually masked prime words are indeed not
consciously perceived, (iii) published replications are rare, and (iv)
many active investigators have accumulated multiple unpublished and
unsuccessful attempts to replicate their own or others' published
findings. Against this background of empirical difficulty, Draine and
Greenwald (9) recently described a "response window"
procedure that, in combination with visual masking procedures that can
be implemented easily on standard computer displays, reliably produces
statistically strong subliminal priming effects. Here we use the
response window procedure to establish a few empirical properties of
subliminal semantic priming.
Subjects (10) performed a categorization task either for
affectively polarized words (to be categorized as pleasant or
unpleasant in meaning) or for common first names (to be categorized as
male or female). In different conditions within each experiment, the
interval between start of prime and start of target stimulus an
interval referred to as the prime-target stimulus onset asynchrony
(SOA) was varied through values that ranged from 67 to 400 ms.
Subjects were assigned to either subliminal or supraliminal priming
according to a counterbalancing scheme that also systematically varied
both the order in which SOA values appeared and which of the two item
sets (male or female names, pleasant or unpleasant words) was used in
the priming task. Each subject provided indirect measure (priming) data
for two or three 50-trial blocks at each SOA value used in an
experiment (11). Direct measures of prime perceptibility
were obtained from separate (later) blocks of trials for which
instructions described the pre-and-postmasking procedure and asked
subjects to make various discriminations of content for the visually
masked stimuli (12).
Results from several response-window experiments are summarized as
regression functions that relate priming to measures of perceptibility
of the primes (Fig. 1). When such regression analyses
use priming and perceptibility measures for which zero values indicate
absence of priming and perceptibility, respectively, the height at
which the function crosses the vertical axis (the regression intercept)
provides a critical test of the hypothesis that priming has occurred
unconsciously. The regression intercept estimates the magnitude of
priming associated with zero perceptibility of the prime. When this
priming magnitude is significantly greater than zero, there is evidence
for unconscious semantic activation (13). In Fig. 1,
intercepts of the regression functions were statistically significant
for all three prime durations (17, 33, and 50 ms).
Fig. 1.
Magnitude of priming as a function of performance on
direct measures of prime perceptibility. Each scatterplot point
represents an individual subject's average performances at both
priming and direct-measure tasks at the indicated prime duration. Each
plot shows both a best-fitting cubic regression function with its 95%
confidence interval (22) and a superimposed linear
regression function. (A and B) Data are from
67-ms SOA masked-priming conditions of experiments reported by
Greenwald and Draine (9, 21), and (C) from two
additional experiments that included conditions with 50-ms prime
durations and 67-ms SOAs (23). Direct measures of prime
perceptibility are from separate (later) blocks of trials on which
subjects were asked to discriminate either lexicality [whether stimuli
presented between premask and postmask were (A) words versus strings of
alternating X's and G's (for example, XGXGX) or (C) words
versus digits] or semantic meaning [whether masked stimuli were (B)
words of pleasant versus unpleasant meaning or male versus female first
names]. Sensitivity (d ) values for direct measures were
computed by treating one category (for example, words) as signal and
the other (for example, digits) as noise, such that guessing word in
response to a digit stimulus would be treated as a false alarm.
Indirect measure (priming) d values were computed by
scoring a hit when (say) a male-name response was given on a trial with
a male-name prime, and a false alarm when a male-name response was
given on a trial with a female-name prime. Printed numerical intercepts
are those for the linear regression in the panel; N, number
of subjects (scatterplot points).
[View Larger Version of this Image (56K GIF file)]
Additional experiments were performed in which 50-ms primes were
presented either with pre- and postmasking, making them subliminal for
most subjects (14), or with no masking, making them
supraliminal (that is, visible). In these experiments
(Fig. 2), subliminal priming was generally weaker than supraliminal
priming. More importantly, however, the shapes of functions relating
magnitude of priming to prime-target SOA were sharply different for
supraliminal and subliminal priming. Supraliminal priming was
consistently strong, perhaps even increasing in strength, across SOAs
varying from 100 to 400 ms. By contrast, subliminal priming was
moderated substantially by SOA, being consistently strong only at a
very short SOA (67 ms) and decreasing to low levels for SOAs longer
than 100 ms. The results shown in Fig. 2 reveal that the temporal span
of subliminal priming is very brief in comparison with that of
supraliminal priming. In retrospect, these findings demonstrate why
subliminal priming has been such an elusive phenomenon in previous
research: Virtually all previous studies of subliminal priming have
used SOAs that exceeded 250 ms. By contrast, Fig. 2 shows that
subliminal priming is readily obtainable only with SOAs of 100 ms or
less.
Fig. 2.
Magnitude of subliminal and
supraliminal priming as a function of prime-target SOA. The measure of
priming is the same signal-detection measure of sensitivity of target
responses to prime meaning shown in Fig. 1. Error bars give 95%
confidence intervals. Data are from experiments in which
(A) both supraliminal and subliminal priming were measured
and (B) only subliminal priming was measured. Prime
duration was constant at 50 ms in all experiments. The results show
supraliminal priming to be obtained strongly at SOAs as long as 400 ms,
whereas subliminal priming decreased sharply at SOAs >100 ms.
[View Larger Version of this Image (47K GIF file)]
Another empirical pattern (Fig. 3) was found to
differentiate subliminal from supraliminal priming. For supraliminal
priming, magnitude of priming was affected by the relation between
prime and target stimuli on the just-preceding trial. When the
preceding trial was an incongruent prime-target pair, supraliminal
priming was weaker than when the preceding trial was a congruent pair.
This finding indicates that impact of the prime was affected by its
recent usefulness (that is, the prime-target congruency), but only for
visible primes; that is, supraliminal (visible) primes were more potent
in facilitation or interference on the trial just after one on which
the prime and target had been congruent, compared to one on which they
had been incongruent. This pattern indicates a form of memory for the
preceding trial's prime-target configuration. By contrast, magnitude
of subliminal priming was unaffected by the congruency or incongruency
of the preceding prime-target pair; that is, subjects gave no evidence
of retaining information about the most recent prime-target
configuration (15).
Fig. 3.
Magnitude of priming after
immediately prior congruent versus incongruent priming trials. Priming
magnitudes are presented in the same format as those in Fig. 2.
The
supraliminal priming data are from nonmasked conditions in which prime
duration was 50 ms and SOA was 150 ms, whereas the subliminal
priming
data are from visually masked conditions that produced largest
subliminal priming effects (prime duration = 50 ms,
SOA = 67 ms). The results show that for supraliminal
priming (but not subliminal
priming), a prior incongruent trial weakens priming relative to a prior
congruent trial.
[View Larger Version of this Image (43K GIF file)]
The findings in Figs. 1, 2, 3 collectively establish a convergence of
stimulus presentation operations and cognitive indicators that define
unconscious semantic activation in the semantic priming experiment. The
chief defining operation is the use of visual masking to produce low
levels of prime perceptibility. The defining cognitive indicators of
subliminal semantic activation are the data patterns shown in Figs. 1, 2, 3: (i) a significant intercept effect in the regression of measures
of priming on measures of the prime stimulus's perceptibility, (ii)
limitation of subliminal priming to target stimuli that occur within
about 100 ms of the visually masked primes, and (iii) absence of any
effect of the preceding trial's prime-target congruence on magnitude
of priming. Figures 2 and 3 show that the latter two findings for
subliminal priming are markedly different from the data patterns
obtained for priming by visible words.
These findings relate closely to two long-established categories of
findings: (i) The central nervous system monitors stimuli outside its
current focus of attention, as evidenced (for example) by humans'
facility in switching attention to a previously unattended sensory
channel when important or unexpected content appears in that channel
(16); and (ii) visual backward masking (postmasking)
interrupts processes that are understood as the transfer of
information from a sensory buffer to working memory. Both of these
findings were central to the information-processing paradigm, developed
in the 1950s and 1960s, that started the modern era of cognitive
psychology (17).
Stated in terms borrowed from the information-processing era, one
can understand the postmask as interrupting transfer of information
about the prime stimulus from sensory buffer to working memory. (In the
older paradigm, working memory was sometimes interpreted as an
equivalent of conscious awareness.) This hypothesized interruption of
transfer explains both the lack of conscious perception of the prime
and its lack of persisting effects, particularly the absence of any
effect of prior-trial prime-target congruence on current-trial
magnitude of priming (Fig. 3). Although the postmask
disrupts conscious perception of the prime, it does not prevent
semantic activation. The occurrence of semantic activation by
consciously unperceived primes indicates that this semantic activation
does not depend on the prime reaching working memory (awareness).
However, this semantic activation is shown to be a very evanescent
phenomenon by the sharply decreasing function (Fig. 2)
that relates subliminal priming to SOA (18).
The rapidity of the rise and fall of subliminal semantic activation
described here exceeds even the briefest persistence previously
demonstrated in cognitive psychology the approximately 250-ms
persistence of unattended visual sensory memory in light-adapted
observers (19). Although this approximately
tenth-of-a-second flicker of subliminal semantic activation has been
described here as a property of stimuli that do not achieve conscious
awareness, it remains possible that it is also a property of visible
stimuli that are masked after a brief presentation. Findings obtained
with mutually masking rapid successions of visible stimuli similarly
suggest a brief duration of semantic activation (20).
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prime condition, the prime was both preceded and followed, at the same
screen location, by strings of consonants that served as forward mask
(premask) and backward mask (postmask). (An example of a mask stimulus
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to confidence in generality of conclusions.
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interpreting such intercept effects is the possibility that a spurious
intercept may be produced when the predictor (in this instance, the
direct measure of prime perceptibility) is imperfectly measured.
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that can produce such spurious intercept effects. Such properties
include both positive regression slopes and average predictor scores
substantially above zero. In contrast, the regression slopes that we
obtained were approximately flat and predictor scores (that is, direct
measures) were noticeably above zero only with prime duration of 50 ms.
For a more detailed discussion of the possibility of spurious intercept
effects, see (21)
-
The level of perceptibility of masked 50-ms primes can
be read from the horizontal distribution of values in the lower panel
of Fig. 1, A and C. Levels of direct measure performance corresponding
to d' values <1.0 are commonly associated with
self-reports of little or no perceptibility. Findings of SOA effects
closely resembling those in Fig. 2B were obtained when the plotted
variable was changed to magnitude of intercept effect from regression
analysis; that is, statistically significant intercept effects were
found only for the 67-ms SOA. The intercept-effect alternative analysis
confirms that the pattern in Fig. 2B for subliminal priming as a
function of SOA is indeed a pattern for unconscious priming. The
plotted analysis in Fig. 2B, which includes all subjects who received
masked priming, is properly comparable to the analysis in Fig. 2A for
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Volume 273,
Number 5282,
Issue of 20 Sep 1996,
pp. 1699-1702.
Copyright © 1996 by The American Association for the Advancement of Science. All rights reserved.
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